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16 May 1959

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
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II. ASIA-AFRICA

40	UAR: President Nasir apparently does not intend to conciliate other relatively pro-Western Arab and North African states, such as Jordan and Tunisia, in order to rally support for his anti-Communist campaign. In a reflective discussion on 9 May, Nasir gave Ambassador Hare the impression that the main obstacle to such a reconciliation is the personalities of the other leaders. Nasir took the general position that while he would not object to a rapprochement, he was not particularly hopeful. (Page 2)	25X ⁻
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25	ν ⁰	namese officials war plan future covert have supported Casihanouk radio and Dap Chhuon coup geserved to consolid	mbodia - South Vietnam: rill meet secretly in Vietr operations in Cambodia, Both countriesparticula mbodian dissident element pamphlet propaganda fol- plot last February. These ate Sihanouk's position and oc, but are basic to Camb	nam this month to arly South Vietnam nts engaged in anti- lowing the abortive e activities have not only d influence him toward	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
	$\eta_{\rm O}$				
			III. THE WEST		
		French officials the warheads in France	aulle is reported indifferent that he permit the storage te. He was unmoved by w	of American atomic arnings from these	25X1
		in France may be	e of the nine US Air Force withdrawn and that France l. Despite the pressures	e's defense posture	
25X1	$\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{O}}$	he will probably contion of French so his objective of Fr	ontinue to oppose storage vereignty, but also becausench "equality" in Westeral policy determination.	not only as a deroga- use he hopes to further rn tripartite global	25X1
		16 May 59	DAILY BRIEF	ii	
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Argentina: President Frondizi's cabinet reorganization, including thus far the ministers of foreign affairs and agriculture and the secretaries of commerce, finance, and transportation, probably presages no change in the US-backed economic stabilization program. Opposition to the program is more intense than Frondizi anticipated and is being exploited by Communists and extreme Peronistas to promote labor agitation and violence.

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DAILY BRIEF

iii

II. ASIA-AFRICA	
Nasir Comments on Relations With Arab States	25X1
In an interview with Ambassador Hare on 9 May, Nasir indicated that he does not contemplate seeking a reconciliation with such Arab states as Jordan and Tunisia in a bid for support of his anti-Communist campaign. Ambassador Hare received the impression that "the main obstacle to reconciliation was a question of personalities," with Nasir's personal dislike for some Arab leaders supplementing more basic differences over questions affecting the Arab world. However, steps toward a rapprochement would probably not be rebuffed by Cairo.	
Nasir again protested that Bourguiba's accusations against the UAR were unjustified, stating that the Tunisian President feared the growth of Arab nationalism among his people. Regarding Jordan, he claimed the UAR was acting with restraint, but had no intention of ever appearing "cozy" with the government of King Husayn. He added that the recent change in government there had made the situation more difficult because of the "poor record" of the new prime minister, Hazza Majalli, but the "last thing" the UAR desired was the "burden" of taking over Jordan and its problems.	
Nasir brushed off relations with Libya, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia as posing no immediate problems. However, he suggested that trouble with Saudi Arabia might follow if King Saud resumed an active role. On relations with the Sudan, he complained that "foreign influence" was the main difficulty, and the current military crisis had also retarded efforts to solve the major problem	
of an agreement on division of the Nile waters.	25X1
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III. THE WEST

De Gaulle Still Unlikely to Approve Storage of American Atomic Warheads in France	25X1
President de Gaulle has rebuffed high French officials who have urged him to permit storage of American atomic warheads in France for the use of the nine US Air Force strike squadrons there,	0574
De Gaulle reportedly gave short shrift to a plea of Chief of Staff General, Ely, and said to Premier Debré, "Who cares if the Americans remove three squadrons to Great Britain?" When Debré argued that removal of the squadrons would weaken France's defense posture, De Gaulle reportedly replied, "We will build our own ICBMs."	25X1
the French President has long opposed foreign control of nuclear weapons in France, and he is not likely to change his mind because of the Berlin crisis. He has stated that he does not expect the Berlin crisis to erupt into war. His decision to withdraw the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO wartime control was taken against the advice of his top military and political advisers.	25X1
His opposition to integration of French national forces in NATO and to foreign control of atomic weapons depots in France is based on the grounds that it is a derogation of French sovereignty. De Gaulle also hopes that his adamant position on this issue will further his primary objective of attaining French "equality" in Western tripartite global policy determination.	
ern tripartite global policy determination.	25X1 25X1

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Argentine Cabinet Reorganization

The Argentine economy minister's statement to Ambassador Beaulac that the present cabinet reorganization does not presage a change in the US-backed stabilization program is in line with recent policy pronouncements which underscore the need to press the program. He admitted that opposition to Frondizi's program was more intense than had been anticipated. Thus far Frondizi has accepted the resignations of the ministers of foreign affairs and agriculture, the secretaries of finance, commerce, and transportation, and his trusted personal adviser, Rogelio Frigerio. Other resignations, especially of lesser officials, are expected before replacements are named next week.

The reorganization, contemplated earlier by Frondizi, was probably timed to counter recently renewed military charges that some officials are inept and too complacent about Peronism and Communism in government. Such charges are being played up by various discontented military elements, especially retired naval supporters of former Vice President Rojas, to gain support for a coup. Most active officers, however, still prefer constitutional government.

Frondizi's dependence on the military has been increased by continuing labor agitation and violence, led mainly by Communists and extremist Peronistas. Communists were issued bottles of gasoline to force bus drivers to comply with the illegal general strike called on 15 May, and the press reports one bus was actually burned. In addition, the discovery on 14 May of serious sabotage of telephone installations and fire-fighting apparatus has reportedly	25X1
raised fears that saboteurs may try to cripple other public utilities.	25X1
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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

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Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Army

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